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Abstract: Advances in biomedical technology have irrevocably jarred open the black box 
of  human  decision  making,  offering  social  scientists  the  potential  to  validate,  reject, 
refine and redefine the individual models of resource allocation that form the foundation 
of modern economics.  In this paper we (1) provide a comprehensive overview of the 
biomedical methods that may be harnessed by economists and other social scientists to 
better understand the economic decision making process; (2) review research that utilizes 
these  biomedical  methods  to  illuminate  fundamental  aspects  of  the  decision  making 
process; and (3) summarize evidence from this literature concerning the basic tenants of 
neoclassical utility that are often invoked for positive welfare analysis of environmental 
policies.    We  conclude  by  raising  questions  about  the  future  path  of  policy  related 
research and the role biomedical technologies will play in defining that path.   
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JEL Codes:  D01, D03, D6, D87Advances  in  biomedical  technology  have  irrevocably  jarred  open  the  black  box  of  human 
decision making, offering social scientists the potential to validate, reject, refine and redefine the 
individual models of resource allocation that form the foundation of modern economics.  In this 
paper we review how these technological advances in measuring the human decision-making 
apparatus  are  reshaping  our  understanding  of  the  models  of  individual  choice  and  begin  to 
address the implications of these findings for the analysis of environmental policies.   
Economists in the 19
th and early 20
th century understood that human behavior was driven 
by complex biological and social processes that generated Benthamite feelings of pleasure and 
pain.    Viner  [113]  bemoaned  that  ―Human  behavior  …..  is  the  product  of  an  unstable  and 
unrational complex of reflex actions, impulses, instincts, habits, customs, fashions and hysteria.‖  
Despite  this  common  view  that  economic  behavior  arose  from  a  complex  decision  making 
process, economists were abandoned process-oriented models of economic choice because, in 
Jevons‘ words [57], they felt ―…it is impossible to measure the feelings of the human heart.‖   
Instead economists have treated the decision-making process as a black box that directly 
links  fundamental,  unobservable  preferences  to  observable  choices.    By  invoking  seemingly 
innocuous  assumptions  regarding  consistency  of  these  preferences  and  the  rationality  of  the 
decision maker, the bedrock of utility theory via revealed preference was formulated, which 
provided a foundation for the intricate, mathematically-sophisticated theories of economic choice 
that  continue  to  dominate  economic  research  today.    While  this  approach  has  been  highly 
successful in many circumstances, a growing body of research documents its limitations and 
develops behaviorally appropriate refinements [14,15,109]. 
Dramatic  advances  in  technology  from  the  fields  of  neurology,  genetics  and 
endocrinology  may  allow  us  to  overcome  Jevons‘  pessimism  concerning  measurements  of   2 
pleasure and pain.  With regard to neurology, the increasing availability, affordability and quality 
of neuroimaging technology allow economists to re-examine process-oriented decision-making 
models by mapping the neuro-physiological mechanisms of choice (see Camerer, Loewenstein 
and Prelec [12]).  With regard to genetics, the human genome project is producing an ever-
expanding set  of techniques  and knowledge that  allow us  to  identify subtle genetic roles  in 
shaping  complex  human  behavior  [76].    Finally,  methods  from  endocrinology  allow  for  the 
measurement of biomarkers of neurological activity that subsequently affect immune function 
and  health  outcomes  [45].    These  methodologies  may  open  new  avenues  of  investigation 
previously thought to be off-limits to economists and, through collaboration with other scientists, 
improve our understanding of economic decision making.   
While a clearer view inside the black box of decision making will improve the descriptive 
quality  of  economic  models,  it  raises  some  potentially  difficult  issues  for  positive  welfare 
analysis.    Traditional  welfare  analysis  of  environmental  policy  has  focused  on  individuals‘ 
consumption and production choices as viewed through the filter of rationality, where rationality 
is defined by a set of axioms concerning underlying preferences, i.e., preferences exist and are 
complete, coherent  and stable.  Furthermore, those endowed with such preferences have the 
information, ability and motivation to enact decisions to satisfy such preferences.  By exploiting 
such assumptions, actual or intended economic actions can be analyzed to draw inferences about 
the underlying structure of preferences, and these preferences can then be used to predict how 
policy  interventions  would  alter  the  levels  of  surplus  achieved  by  the  affected  individuals.  
Policy makers can use such information in cost benefit analysis or in other modes of evaluation 
to rank the social desirability of competing policy options.   
These policy evaluation methods are only useful if the axiomatic base upon which they   3 
are built is valid and if the techniques used to execute analyses are consistent and replicable.  The 
validity  of  the  assumptions  underlying  positive  welfare  analysis  and  related  evaluation 
techniques have, historically, been difficult to test, though experimental methods in psychology 
and economics have increasingly pointed to inconsistencies in the functioning of the black box of 
decision making.  The issues explored in this review include how biomedical techniques might 
inform us concerning the efficacy of hypothetical approaches in assessing underlying preference 
structures, the coherency of individual preferences, and the stability of individual preferences. 
New biomedical techniques allow researchers to look inside this black box and begin to 
articulate the physiological mechanisms that generate human decisions.  While this provides 
another  and,  often,  unparalleled  way  to  test  key  tenets  of  neoclassical  utility  theory,  these 
techniques are not a panacea, as peeking under the lid of the black box of decision making 
reveals  a  highly  intricate  and  interconnected  network  of  smaller  black  boxes,  whose 
interconnections  and  individual  roles  are  still  being  explored.  Even  as  each  individual 
component  within  the  black  box  becomes  clearer  to  us,  there  remains  substantial  work  to 
interpret if these physiological mechanics confirm, overlap or contradict the assumptions upon 
which welfare theory is built.  Furthermore, if contradictions exist, economists must fully assess 
if welfare analysis techniques can be adapted to yield meaningful positive insights. 
While we are not the first to review the influence of emerging biomedical techniques on 
economics [12,74,102,117], our efforts enrich and refine past work on several fronts.  First, we 
provide  a  more  comprehensive  review  of  biomedical  techniques  currently  being  utilized  in 
interdisciplinary research, including techniques from molecular genetics and endocrinology that 
have received little or no treatment in reviews by economists.  Second, we review the literature 
with an eye toward deriving implications for welfare analysis and analysis of environmental   4 
policies in particular, while other reviews have focused more broadly on the implications of 
biomedical techniques for economics, finance and law [12,18,56,102,117].  
I. Emerging Biomedical Methods 
Through the development of technologies and methods that monitor the activity of the brain and 
body and assess the role of genetics in shaping behavior, the biomedical field has improved our 
understanding of the way the mind and body execute the decision making process.  This section 
and Table 1 provides an overview of methods that may inform the work of social scientists. 
I.A. Neural Monitoring Methods 
The neuron is the basic communication unit within the brain.  The billions of neurons in the 
human brain communicate with one another via an electrochemical process.  Neurons receive 
electrochemical  signals  across  small  gaps  called  synapses  from  other  neurons,  and  generate 
electrochemical current based upon this input.  If these electrical currents, when added together, 
surpass  a threshold, an  action potential  is  generated, whereby current  travels  throughout  the 
length of the neuron and causes the release of its own electrochemical signal (usually a chemical 
neurotransmitter like dopamine or serotonin) into adjacent synapses that reach other neurons.   
These  firings  transmit  information  between  connected  neurons  and  facilitate  all  the 
brain‘s functions, including decision making.  The challenge of monitoring neural activity is to 
develop techniques that accurately measure this activity.  The ideal technique would allow for 
perfect  spatial  coverage  (i.e.,  a  maximal  field  of  view  to  all  parts  of  the  brain)  and  spatial 
resolution (down to the individual neuron or even to specific neuron components).  The ideal 
technique would also provide perfect temporal resolution, i.e., to the fraction of a millisecond of 
activity, as neuronal activity is rapid.  The ideal measurement technique would also distinguish 
the  various  activities  taking  place  in  the  brain,  including  blood  flow,  chemical  flows   5 
(neurotransmitter, hormones) and electrical firings.  Furthermore, the ideal technology would 
allow the subject to move about freely and comfortably as they might in a ‗normal‘ decision 
making  context  and,  of  course,  not  threaten  the  subject‘s  health  or  safety.    In  practice  no 
technique meets all of these ideals and each method features a mix of benefits and limitations. 
I.A.1. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
This  technology  has  become  popular  among  neuroscientists  and  neuroeconomists  because  it 
provides a non-invasive
1 means for measuring brain activity.  Unlike static MR images taken in 
clinical settings for, say, exploring structural deficits with a bad knee or exploring the extent of a 
brain lesion, functional MRI provides a dynamic view of brain activity.   
Brain dynamics are captured by repeatedly imaging the brain during a subject‘s exposure 
and response to  experimental stimuli.  fMRI  does  not  directly measure neuronal  firing rate; 
rather  it  measures  a  necessary  correlate.    In  order  to  fire,  neurons  require  energy,  which  is 
delivered via blood to the region that is firing.  As the energy arrives the ratio of oxygenated and 
deoxygenated hemoglobin changes.  The MRI scanner tracks the level of oxygenated blood at 
positions throughout the brain by using magnetic pulses that result in detectable MR signals 
sensitive to blood-oxygen level.  This is translated into a measurement referred to as the blood-
oxygenated level dependent (BOLD) signal.  Further, the brain has little ability to store energy; 
hence, the magnetic changes due to changes in blood flow are interpreted as changes in neural 
activity.  While neuronal firings change by the millisecond, the blood flow necessary to support 
such firings is not precisely correlated to the onset of neural firings.  Though our understanding 
of this relationship between blood flow and neuronal firings is improving, it remains imperfect.  
The implication is that fMRI measurements may provide a noisy proxy to the level and timing of 
neuronal firings (see Gore [47] for a concise overview of fMRI principles).     6 
Compared to many technologies, fMRI is desirable because it is non-invasive, provides 
good spatial resolution (down to several millimeters), good temporal resolution (once every few 
seconds), and good spatial coverage (all brain regions can be scanned).  Health or safety risks are 
negligible and subjects are generally open to participation as many are familiar with MRI from 
personal experience or common knowledge.  Subjects can receive sensory stimuli of nearly any 
type during scanning (audio, visual, touch, taste, smell) and can respond via touchpad response.   
A limitation is that subjects must remain still during scanning; movements greater than 
several millimeters can mean that collected data are not reliable.  This limits the use of fMRI by 
populations with limited ability to control movement (e.g., young children).  Also some subjects 
become claustrophobic in the scanner while some obese patients may not be able to view visual 
stimuli in certain types of scanners.  Numerous challenges also exist in assuring high quality 
scans, particularly for parts of the brain near open cavities (e.g., near the sinuses), but techniques 
are evolving rapidly to improve the consistency and resolution of these images. 
I.A.2 Positron Emission Topography (PET) Scanning 
Rather than measuring  variations  in  the  components  of blood,  as  with fMRI, PET scanning 
utilizes  radiological  tracers  (e.g.,  H2O
15,  water  with  a  radioactive  oxygen  isotope)  that  the 
investigator adds into the subject‘s blood stream (usually intravenously though sometimes via 
inhalation).  The scanner then measures the level of radioactive emission during the tracer‘s 
decay and uses this to develop a measurement of the regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) at 
various locations throughout the brain (see [119] for an overview of PET principles).   
PET scans produce images of blood flow for all brain structures with a slightly coarser 
degree of spatial resolution than fMRI.  Moreover, the temporal resolution of PET is quite low, 
as  the  construction  of  these  high  quality  images  requires  averaging  rCBF  over  minutes  of   7 
scanning.  This does not allow for dynamic analysis of neural activity as with fMRI and, hence, 
limits the topics of inquiry available with PET.  Furthermore, like fMRI, it requires the subject to 
remain almost perfectly during scanning.  Another PET disadvantage is that subject recruitment 
is more difficult: people are not as familiar with PET and the mention of ‗needles‘ and ‗low-level 
radiological injections‘ often dampens the enthusiasm of recruits.  Furthermore, because of the 
radioactive materials involved, certain subjects (e.g., children) are excluded from participation. 
One  key  advantage  of  PET  is  that  different  radiological  tracers  adhere  to  different 
proteins  and  metabolites.    For  example,  a  tracer  can  be  chosen  that  binds  to  a  single 
neurotransmitter, such as dopamine, which is hypothesized to serve a key role in processing 
rewards in the brain.  If the researcher is interested in the mechanics and dynamics of a particular 
neurotransmitter  system,  PET  can  provide  a  more  accurate  measurement  than  fMRI,  though 
several other technologies (discussed below) can also image activity of key neurotransmitters. 
I.A.3 Electroencephalography of Event-Related Potentials (EEG of ERP) 
EEG  measures  electrical  activity  (event-related  potential  or  ERP)  originating  from  neuronal 
firings that emanate from the surface of the brain.  Electrodes are placed at various spots on the 
scalp,  and  each  electrode  measures  ERPs,  which  are  the  summation  of  electrical  responses 
generated from nearby neurons in response to a stimulus (event) provided by the researcher.       
Unlike fMRI and PET, EEG measures the electrical signal generated by neural activity 
directly (rather than some correlate such as blood flow), which results in temporal resolution to 
the  millisecond.    EEG  is  often  less  intimidating  to  potential  subjects  and  affords  them 
considerable freedom of movement, particularly compared to fMRI and PET scans.  It is also 
relatively  cheap  and  portable,  allowing  for  more  observations  on  the  same  budget  and  the 
potential  to  take  the  technology  ‗on  the  road‘  if  needed.    Together,  these  attributes  allow   8 
researchers to conduct larger studies that include a more diverse subject population.   A key 
drawback is that ERPs generated by structures inside the brain‘s outer layer (cortex) cannot be 
measured.  EEG can be used in  tandem  with  fMRI or PET  and provide localized temporal 
resolution unavailable from these other techniques (see [27] for an overview of EEG principles). 
I.A.4 Magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
In addition to electrical currents, an active neuron also generates a localized change in magnetic 
field, and MEG measures these changes.  Unlike electrical current, which forms the basis of 
measurement for EEG, the location of magnetic field  strength  changes can be located more 
precisely, providing even greater spatial resolution of activity for cortical regions of the brain 
than EEG.  Furthermore, because the magnetic field change in a neuron is an instantaneous 
byproduct of changes in electrical current, it provides similar temporal resolution to EEG [103].   
MEG has  limitations with  respect  to  spatial  coverage, including limited coverage for 
structures deep inside the brain and for neurons that fail to run parallel to the surface of the head.  
However,  as  with  EEG,  computational  advances  are  continually  improving  MEG‘s  spatial 
resolution.  Like EEG, it is non-invasive, though mobility is difficult as the scanner is stationary, 
and subject movement during scanning reduces measurement quality.  Unlike fMRI and PET, 
most scanners cover only the head and allow the subject to either lie down or sit up.  MEG 
subjects will often undergo a structural MRI to provide a precise brain map upon which MEG 
output is superimposed.  This lessens subject time in a MRI, but does not eliminate its use and 
requires budgeting for the use of two major pieces of biomedical equipment. 
I.A.5 Single Photon Emission Computerized Tomography (SPECT) 
As with PET scanning, SPECT uses radiological tracers to measure the flow of a biological 
material within the brain, where the nature of the radiological tracer determines whether the scan   9 
will measure rCBF or neurotransmitter flow.  Hence, SPECT and PET share many common 
advantages and disadvantages (see [114] for a SPECT overview).  SPECT typically features 
tracers that decay more slowly than PET tracers, meaning SPECT‘s temporal resolution is even 
coarser than that for PET.  PET also  does  a better job  constructing images  of deeper brain 
structures.  However, because SPECT tracers decay more slowly, they can be manufactured at 
central locations and transported further distances than PET tracers.  This minimizes on-site staff 
and instrumentation costs, and often makes SPECT easier and cheaper to implement than PET.   
I.A.6 Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIR) 
By exposing the scalp to particular wavelengths of light, fNIR can record the relative ratio of 
oxygenated and deoxygenated blood.  This imaging modality shares features with both fMRI and 
EEG.  Like fMRI the scanning measures blood rather than neuronal electrochemical activity 
directly.  Hence, fNIR‘s temporal resolution is similar to that of fMRI.  Like EEG all fNIR 
measurement takes place at the scalp (minimally intrusive) and allows for considerable subject 
mobility during measurement.  The scalp-based measurement approach limits coverage to the 
cortical (outer) brain regions and provides challenges and limitation to spatial resolution for the 
cortical  regions  covered,  which  limits  investigation  from  topics  that  are  thought  to  involve 
deeper brain structures or require precise spatial resolution (see [36] for a fNIR overview).   
I.A.7 Single Unit Neuronal Recording 
This highly invasive technique involves inserting an ultra-thin electrode into the brain through a 
hole drilled in  the skull.   This  technique is  used only  with  animal  subjects  in  experimental 
settings due to its invasive nature.  Careful placement of the electrode, often guided with imaging 
or other guidance techniques, allows for the procedure to be non-fatal, though some minor brain 
tissue damage does occur during placement (see [43], pg. 106, for an overview).  The electrode is   10 
placed just outside the membrane of a single neuron and measures the electrochemical activity of 
a single neuron or a small cluster of neurons adjacent to the tip of the electrode.  Specifically it 
records the exact time of a neuronal spike.  This technique features the greatest degree of spatial 
resolution  of  all  techniques  considered  here  (another  animal  technique  called  patch-clamp 
recording measures electrochemical activity within the neuron, but it is not explored here).   
Spatial coverage is limited, however, as information is collected for only a single neuron.  
Often  researchers  will  reposition  the  electrode  several  times  to  measure  several  neurons  of 
interest,  while  other  researchers  may  use  multiple  electrodes  simultaneously.    Because  the 
electrode  is  collecting  information  about  the  electrical  activity  of  the  neuron,  single  unit 
recording provides temporal resolution at the sub-millisecond level.   
Economists may be hesitant to use animals in research that is meant to illuminate the 
human decision making process.  Our brain structure and function are quite similar to those of 
mammals (particularly primates); many insights into human decision making can be gained from 
animal  experimentation.    While  results  can  be  informative  and  suggestive,  they  can  rarely 
provide definitive insights into human decision making.  Animal laboratories are associated with 
extensive maintenance and management issues of their own (think weekend feedings and angry 
protesters) and may present a barrier to economists without collaborators in such laboratories. 
A related animal-only technique that mirrors the spatial coverage and resolution of single 
unit recording  is  called  cyclic voltammetry.  In this  technique  the electrode embedded in  the 
animal‘s brain measures key neurotransmitters rather than electrical activity [99]. 
I.B. Neural Manipulation Methods 
These  techniques  leverage  differences  in  neural  functioning  that  arises  due  to  intentional  or 
incidental manipulation of neural structure or function.  These methods leverage known variation   11 
in neural structure or functioning either within subject or between closely matched subjects to 
identify how differences affect decision making and other cognitive tasks.  Furthermore, some 
manipulation techniques can be used in tandem with neural monitoring techniques to provide 
even greater insight into the neural basis of decision making and other brain function. 
I.B.1 Lesion Studies 
Lesion studies use human subjects that have suffered from naturally occurring brain lesions.  A 
lesion usually eliminates permanently the activity of the neurons in a particular brain region.  
The lesion‘s location and extent is typically identified via imaging techniques or post-mortem 
surgery.  Lesion subjects are matched with non-affected subjects on the basis of age, intelligence, 
gender and other potentially relevant characteristics.  Both groups are then exposed to identical 
stimuli (e.g., play the same decision making game); responses are recorded and analyzed across 
groups.  By systematically altering the stimuli and looking for differential responses between 
lesion patients and normals, investigators infer the role of the brain region containing the lesion. 
Human lesion studies face several limitations.  The number of lesion patients available is 
limited, leading to small sample problems.  Furthermore, the location and extent of lesions across 
subjects may vary, which leads to difficulty in interpreting the results.  Also, the amount of time 
between the onset of the lesion and the testing could be heterogeneous.  Patients with long-
standing lesions may display significant plasticity and develop alternative neural circuitry in 
response to the lesion while those with new lesions may have not.  In addition, because the 
timing of the on-set of a lesion is not predictable, it is rare to have within subject data (pre- and 
post-lesion) available.  Finally, access to such patients usually occurs within a clinical setting, 
which greatly increases the resource commitment necessary for the investigator and limits the 
number of settings and locations at which such research can be conducted.   12 
However,  lesion  studies  have  revealed  key  tenants  of  human  behavior  and  were 
particularly important in the pre-fMRI era for helping researchers determine the role of various 
brain  regions  in  governing  human  behavior  (see  [25]  for  a  non-technical  introduction  to 
executive brain function that relies on lesion studies).  Even today, lesion studies lead to critical 
insights, such as Naqvi et al.‘s [88] insight that life-long smokers who suffered stroke-related 
injury to the insula easily stopped smoking despite numerous pre-stroke attempts to quit.   
In animal studies, brain lesions can be induced by removing portions of the brain or by 
exposing regions to electrical current or chemical solutions (see [43], pg. 111, for an overview).  
Compared to human lesion studies, the treatment group is more homogeneous and analyses can 
leverage within-subject data (pre- and post-lesion) for better testing.  Chemically induced lesions 
are most common as the appropriate chemical choice can provide precise control over the extent 
of the lesion and the type of neuronal structure that is disabled.  This includes the ability to 
destroy only the portion of cells that, for example, carry key neurotransmitters.  These studies 
share many of the common limitations and obstacles of animal studies previously discussed.   
I.B.2 Electrical Brain Stimulation (EBS) 
Electrical  stimulation  studies  essentially  reverse  the  direction  of  electrical  flow  discussed  in 
single unit recording.  In single unit recording, an electrode is placed near a neuron to measure 
nearby electrical activity.  EBS reverses the process with external electrical current emitted from 
the  electrode  tip  to  a  point  within  the  brain.    EBS  shares  many  of  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages of single unit recording.  It directly influences electrical activity in the region of 
interest and this region can be highly localized and implemented at a very fine time scale.  It is a 
highly  invasive  technique  that  often  requires  imaging  or  other  guidance  techniques  such  to 
ensure correct electrode placement.  Once installed in the brain and sufficient recovery time is   13 
allowed, animals are able to move freely and exhibit little difference in base behavior.  EBS led 
to some seminal insights into the neural basis of reward [94] as rats implanted with electrodes 
would forgo food and suffer great hardship to trigger stimulation in key neural regions.   
I.B.3. Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
Like  electrical  brain  stimulation,  this  technique  focuses  on  altering  the  electrical  activity  of 
neurons.  Unlike EBS, TMS is non-invasive and is used with humans.  Experimenters attach a 
device to the subject‘s head that generates a magnetic field that alters the activity of nearby 
(cortical) neurons.  While non-invasive and generally safe, most protocols require a medical 
doctor‘s presence due to the possibility of seizure.  Subjects are mobile during the treatment than 
during  MRI  and  PET  scans.    Compared  to  EBS,  TMS  provides  coarser  spatial  resolution, 
allowing localization of the effect down to a region of a centimeter or two.     
Unlike  EBS,  which  clearly  enhances  increases  electrical  activity  near  the  neurons  of 
interest, the relationship between neural activity and TMS is still under investigation, with an 
initial consensus that low frequency TMS often retards neuronal firing compared to baseline 
while higher frequencies enhance the firing rate [98].  However, the relationship between TMS 
frequency and alterations in neuronal activity can be region specific [65].  Hence complementary 
use of fMRI is often suggested to validate the effect of the TMS treatment upon brain activity.  
Furthermore, the brain responds differently to altered TMS timing (number and length of TMS 
exposures) and intensity.  The effects of TMS also dissipate rapidly (within minutes), meaning 
the  window  of  opportunity  for  conducting  behavioral  tests  of  subjects  is  limited.    Another 
limitation is that TMS is only useful for the outer (cortical) regions of the brain, whereas EBS 
and lesion interventions can affect deeper brain regions as well.   
I.B.4. Pharmacological Manipulation   14 
Many drugs affect how the brain functions and, hence, lend themselves for use in human and 
animal experimentation.  Pharmacological interventions are particularly useful for examining the 
role of neurotransmitters as many drugs block the neural uptake of a specific neurotransmitter 
(antagonist) or maximize its presence and uptake into neurons (agonists).  By treating subjects 
with a neurotransmitter antagonist or agonist, the role of that neurotransmitter during decision 
making can be explored.  As drug treatments are temporary, experimental designs can generate 
both within-subject data points (pre-treatment, post-treatment and post-recovery) and between 
subjects data points.  Furthermore, such manipulations can be used with brain imaging.  
Implementing  pharmacological  interventions  requires  that  investigators  surpass  even 
greater  scrutiny  with  respect  to  subject  care,  particularly  when  administering  controlled 
substances.    While  subject  follow  up  is  minimal  after  most  fMRI  studies,  researchers  must 
monitor  and  ensure  that  subjects  have  no  adverse  reactions  to  the  drug  used  in  the  study.  
Furthermore,  the  investigator  and  laboratory  are  exposed  to  greater  administrative  and  legal 
burdens because they may need to acquire, store and administer controlled substances.  A further 
limitation of pharmacological manipulations is that there often have poor spatial resolution, as 
diffusion of a drug and its effects are difficult to control once ingested, injected or inhaled.  
Invasive  animal  techniques,  such  as  microiontophoresis,  do  allow  for  the  release  of  small 
amounts of a drug to a single point in the brain.   
I.B.5. Dietary Manipulation 
Manipulating a subject‘s diet can achieve also alter the presence of certain neurotransmitters like 
drug manipulations.  Some neurotransmitters are synthesized using only a limited number of 
essential amino acids (e.g., serotonin is synthesized only from tryptophan).  If these amino acids 
are absent from the diet, the body is unable to produce that neurotransmitter.  This differs from   15 
the effects caused by drug interventions in which the volume of neurotransmitter is unchanged 
but its level of uptake by neurons is controlled by the drug.  In practice human or animal subjects 
are  made  to  fast  for  a  period  (usually  overnight  for  humans)  after  which  randomly  chosen 
subjects are fed meals lacking the amino acids necessary for the synthesis of the neurotransmitter 
of interest.  All other subjects are fed a similar tasting meal with these amino acids.  Both groups 
are exposed to the same experimental stimulus and responses recorded (this could also include 
neuroimaging or biofeedback measurements).  Between group and within-subject analysis can 
reveal the role of the neurotransmitter‘s presence for the tasks at hand.  
The key advantage of this method compared to drug studies is that the infrastructure and 
regulatory burden is minimized.  The disadvantages of this method compared to drug studies 
several.  It is difficult to ensure that all subjects have fasted for an equivalent time.  Furthermore, 
fewer  neurotransmitters  can  be  studied  via  dietary  than  drug  manipulation.    Also,  dietary 
methods can only ensure the depletion of a neurotransmitter while drugs can either promote or 
block its uptake by neurons (see [40] for a review of dietary tryptophan depletion studies).     
I.C. Biological Monitoring and Manipulation 
The body‘s receipt of stimuli induces not just neuronal activity, but also a related cascade of 
responses from the nervous and endocrine systems that impacts the entire body.  The endocrine 
system, which is coordinated by the hypothalamus in the brain, secretes hormones that travel 
through blood and other fluids to cells throughout the body.  For example, decision making 
scenarios might cause stress, which directs the hypothalamus to trigger actions in the endocrine 
and nervous systems.  Stress-triggered feedback helps the body respond to stress, i.e., to survive 
the source of the stress, often via a fight or flight response.   
Economic interactions often involve interpersonal contact (bargaining, exchange), which   16 
can trigger hormonal secretions associated with the reaction to that contact (trust, aggression, 
attraction).  Measurement of hormones  can provide information about  how stress and social 
interactions involved in decision making can affect biophysical response.  The body synthesizes 
and  circulates  dozens  of  hormones,  some  of  which  also  serve  as  neurotransmitters  (e.g., 
oxytocin).  Epinephrine and norepinephrine are hormones that rapidly deploy in response to 
fundamental  threats  and  allow  the  body  to  respond  quickly  (greater  blood  flow  and  lung 
function).  Cortisol, which is associated with stress, and adrenocorticotropic hormone, which 
stimulates the release of cortisol, can be measured as well. 
Outside of the arena of stress, the levels of several other hormones are influenced by 
interpersonal interaction.  Higher levels of oxytocin are thought to reduce fight/flight tendencies 
and promote interpersonal bonding.  Oxytocin, which is generated during birth in women and 
during sexual orgasm in both sexes, is believed to facilitate the trust and bonding necessary for 
success in such settings.  Alternatively, testosterone levels are often correlated with aggressive 
behavior that undermines bonding and may influence social interactions during conflict, though 
the direction of causation between aggression and testosterone is still an open topic.   
Cortisol levels can be accurately assayed from a subject‘s saliva, which allows for a non-
invasive  collection  technique  that  few  potential  subjects  find  objectionable  (see  [72,83]  for 
cortisol studies featuring gamblers).  High quality measurement of many hormones, however, 
requires the collection of blood, which entails considerably more resources for collection (e.g., 
nurses) and may repel potential subjects.  As in drug studies, hormone levels can be manipulated 
by introducing additional amounts of a hormone or a hormone blocker into a subject‘s body 
during an experiment.  These methods share many of the same opportunities and challenges as 
drug  studies.    While  most  neurotransmitter  drug  treatments  are  administered  orally,  some   17 
hormone manipulations involve nasal administration [70]. 
Hormone secretion and other responses coordinated by the hypothalamus through the 
central  nervous  system  will  result  in  measurable  changes  in  body  function.    These  include 
changes in heart function (measured via an electrocardiogram), respiration, blood pressure, pulse 
rate, pupil dilation, eye blink rate, skin conductance response and skin temperature.  See Lo and 
Repin [77] for a study of securities traders‘ responses to events during the trading day.   
I.D. Genetic Methods 
Genes are the fundamental unit of heredity in all organisms.  A gene is a unit of DNA that carries 
directions for synthesizing a specific protein or proteins.  With the help of enzymes and mRNA, 
genes direct the synthesis of proteins.  Proteins, in turn, are the building blocks for tissues and 
organs,  and  for  the  synthesis  of  hormones  and  neurotransmitters.    If  two  individuals  have 
different genes, i.e., differ in their genotype, they may differ in protein creation, in the systems 
that  rely  upon  those  proteins,  in  the  functions  those  systems  control,  and,  eventually,  in 
observable traits  or behavior (phenotype).  Scientists have become increasingly interested in 
understanding how genotype may affect complex behavioral phenotypes, including personality 
differences, complex psychological conditions, and decision making tendencies. 
Each DNA strand consists of four nucleotides bases – adenine (A), thymine (T), guanine 
(G) and cytosine (C) – that form a genetic alphabet.  These bases physically form the iconic 
double helix.  The order of these bases determines the gene‘s eventual function.  A complete set 
of an organism‘s DNA is known as its genome, which carries all instructions needed to build and 
maintain the organism.  The human genome has about 3 billion DNA base pairs organized into 
20,000 – 25,000 genes on 23 chromosomes.  Genetic variation across humans is small in one 
sense, i.e., two humans share about 99.9 percent of the same DNA base pairs in their genetic   18 
map.  Given there are 3 billion base pairs, however, this still allows for 3 million differences. 
These  differences  range  from  changes  of  a  single  base,  referred  to  as  a  single  nucleotide 
polymorphism (SNP) to more extensive changes involving multiple bases.  These differences 
allow  for  significant  variation  across  individuals.  Understanding  how  genetic  differences 
manifest presents significant analytical challenges.  Further complicating the analysis is the fact 
that the impact of some genetic variation upon behavior does not manifest unless triggered by 
environmental triggers.  Such findings have fundamentally altered the perennial ‗nature versus 
nurture‘ debate – the two interact leaving nature versus nurture as a false dichotomy.  In this 
section we review some of the approaches used in genetic studies of behavior. 
I.D.1. Phenotype-Genotype Association Studies 
Association studies correlate subjects‘ phenotype and genotype.  Phenotype can be assessed by 
surveys or responses during experiments, though most studies use medically defined phenotypes 
(a disease or disorder).  Genotyping takes place via a suite of chemical techniques (see [73] for 
one overview).  Genotyping involves identifying common variations in genes known to impact 
the production of proteins with a connection to a system of interest.  For example, when the 
phenotype is depression, it is logical to look for variation in the gene that creates the protein 
necessary for transporting serotonin in the brain  because many depression medications work 
because they alter the brain‘s serotonin levels.     
Several  criteria  are  often  applied  for  selecting  the  genetic  variations  subject  to 
investigation.  First, certain genotypes are chosen if previous research identified associations 
between that genotype and related phenotypes.  Second, other genetic variations in the same gene 
may be also explored.  Furthermore, it is common to focus on genetic variation that is common 
across a population rather than the rare variation because it is difficult to enroll enough subjects   19 
with a rare variant.  For more complex phenotypes, researchers will often cast a broader net and 
search for multiple variations in several genes.  This leads to statistical difficulties, however, as 
adjustments necessary to account for multiple hypotheses testing often yield very low statistical 
power,  even  for  large  sample  populations  (see  [2]  for  an  overview  of  relevant  statistical 
approaches and [20, 50] for a discussion of the limitations of association studies).   
The cost of genetic testing is decreasing and can be handled by many commercial and 
academic  laboratories.    Subjects  must  provide  an  appropriate  biological  specimen  to  the 
experimenter for testing.  This can consist of a skin sample (e.g., a swab from inside the cheek 
like on television police shows) or a blood sample, which requires medical staff support.     
I.D.2. Endophenotype-Genotype Association Studies 
Association  studies  are  often  criticized  because  the  correlative  results  often  provide  weak 
statistical power and the results are often difficult to replicate.  This is not surprising given that 
there are many ways in which underlying genetic differences can be ‗smoothed out‘ prior to 
manifesting as an observable trait, behavior or disorder.  That is, even if differential protein 
synthesis occurs, and it creates heterogeneous functioning of one system, other systems may 
compensate,  thus  preventing  an  observable  difference.    Furthermore,  the  phenotypic 
classification method, e.g., surveys, may miss any remaining differences.  This has led to the 
development of studies that attempt to correlate genotype to endophenotypes [80].  These are 
differences  in  systems-level  functioning,  e.g.,  differences  in  neural  activation  or  cortisol 
secretion.  Such studies generally require smaller subject populations because additional sources 
of noise, i.e., going from the systems to organism level of observation, are removed.     
I.D.3. Phenotype-Genotype Linkage Studies 
Genetic  association  studies  suffer  from  excessive  genetic  variation.    That  is,  typically  the   20 
researcher chooses a single phenotype and attempts to correlate this variation with one or more 
genetic variations.  However, even if the researcher searches for hundreds of candidate sources 
of genetic variation, there remain potentially millions of other sources of genetic heterogeneity 
that exist among the subject pool that are not controlled and that may affect phenotype.  Genetic 
linkage studies use subject pools consisting of family members to reduce the degree of unwanted 
genetic  variation  across  subjects  (see  [34]  for  an  overview  of  linkage  approaches  and 
comparisons to association studies).  The trick, of course, is to find family members that have 
enough  variation  in  the  phenotype  and  candidate  genes  of  interest.    Compared  to  simple 
association  studies,  linkage  studies  require  fewer  total  subjects,  though  recruitment  of  those 
subjects becomes more difficult because multiple family members must be enrolled.   
I.D.4. Genotype-Phenotype Associations Mitigated by Environmental Factors 
The activity of genes need not be constant throughout life.  While genes are commonly perceived 
as a genetic blueprint, the more accurate analogy is the gene as a switch.  While some genes are 
turned on or off by internal triggers as part of an organism‘s developmental process, other genes 
may be triggered by environmental stressors.  Several studies show how the relationship between 
genotype and a complex phenotype only holds for subjects exposed to such stressors [e.g., 17].   
This has led researchers to emphasize the importance of measuring subjects‘ exposure to 
environmental influences that can influence gene expression (see [84] for an overview).  For 
some phenotypes this often includes recording a subject‘s exposure to stressful life events.  This 
encompasses several additional challenges as some subjects will not share information about 
certain stressful events (e.g., rape).  Others may have difficulty recalling events that occurred 
during childhood, which is a particularly influential time for many environmental influences.   
I.D.5. Whole Genome and Phenome Scans   21 
With rapid technological advances, it is now possible to receive more comprehensive 
information  concerning  the  sources  of  genetic  variation  across  a  subject  pool  rather  than 
searching for variation across only a couple of well known polymorphisms.  Hence, researchers 
can focus on identifying the phenotype of interest and then engage in a broad scale expedition to 
identify correlates within the genetic map.  With billions of DNA base pairs and millions of 
sources of variation, this entails dramatic statistical hurdles, especially with regard to assessing 
statistical  significance  across  multiple  tests  and  allowing  for  simple  and  subtle  interactions 
among sources of genetic variation.  Statisticians are testing new pattern recognition algorithms 
and wielding theory to provide more efficient approaches for assessing power and significance 
for such wide-scale data mining (see [16] for a review of statistical challenges and [96] for an 
overview of genome-wide studies of complex behavioral traits).   
One can also reverse the strategy and instead conduct a whole phenome scan [58].  A 
subject is exposed to as many phenotype classifications as possible.  Subsequently the variation 
in one or more genes is then correlated against multiple phenotypic classifications.  While this is 
the newest genetics-based methodology to be proposed, it is the one with the greatest potential 
involvement  of  social  scientists.    Such  protocol  may  involve  more  subject  time,  as  detailed 
knowledge of traits and behavior are required.   
II. Biomedical Insights into the Human Decision Making Process 
Life is a perpetual sequence of choices ranging from the mundane (should I push the snooze 
button?) to the monumental (do  I marry this  person, choose a particular cancer treatment?).  
Decision making is a multifaceted process involving sensory capture, information processing, 
and motor control.  Possible actions must be defined; short- and long-term costs and benefits 
must be assigned to each action; a choice must be rendered and implemented; and the outcome   22 
must be assessed and remembered.  While seemingly manageable, this entire sequence of events 
must  be  executed  as  several  other  decisions  are  simultaneously  deliberated,  giving  rise  to 
demand for scarce biological and neural resources for executing each choice process.   
In this section we overview an emerging vision of how decision making is executed in 
the brain, summarizing a rapidly growing body of research using animal and human methods 
previously outlined.  This vision of the decision making process is fluid at this point in time, as 
new data rapidly gives rise to new models, which in turn stimulates additional experimentation.   
II.A. A Bottom-Up View of Economic Decision Making: RUM in the LIP 
One approach to understanding economic behavior from a neurological perspective is to focus on 
a very simple decision, e.g., choosing one option from a limited choice set akin to a random 
utility maximization (RUM) problem, and to fully articulate the neural circuitry engaged during 
decision  making.    Once  a  neurologically  articulate  understanding  of  the  simple  decision  is 
gained, one can build from this foundation to understand more complex economic decisions. 
Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer [46] review research that reveals how the monkey brain 
renders decisions in several simple economic contexts.  Bottom-up researchers rely heavily upon 
animal models and have made great progress by studying non-human primates.  The monkey 
brain is remarkably similar in structure and function to the human brain and allows for invasive 
techniques that provide localized measurement precision not obtainable with techniques used 
with humans.  This leads to challenges in interpreting differences between animal and human 
results: do differences reflect basic deviations in neural structure and function or differences in 
the spatial and temporal delineation afforded by animal versus human measurement techniques? 
These  primate  studies  provide  fascinating  revelations  about  decision  making  by 
identifying and measuring key regions of neural circuitry that lead monkeys to ‗pull the trigger‘   23 
on simple RUM decisions.  Studies of this ilk [30,49,75,95,104] use a monkey who is motivated 
by a primary need (thirst) to make decisions that alter the receipt of a salient reward (water or 
juice).  Monkeys cast decisions by altering the focus of their vision, which is tracked by special 
equipment.  For example, a monkey is trained to expect a reward after shifting its gaze from a 
central point to a stimulus presented on the left hand side of its visual field, while looking at a 
stimulus on the right-hand side may result in no reward.
2  The final part of these experiments is 
the installation of single-neuron recording devices (see section I) in the regions of interest.   
What has emerged from these studies is a model of the neurobiological underpinnings of 
discrete choice (for a more detail, see [46] and figure 1).  A region called the lateral intraparietal 
(LIP) area generates a map analogous to the visual stimulus viewed by the monkey, only that the  
neuronal firings at each spatial location on this map correspond to the relative expected value of 
the reward (relative expected milliliters of fluid) the monkey associates with that spot.   
The neuronal firing levels do not correspond  perfectly to the relative expected reward 
because there is a stochastic element to neuronal firings at each location that appears to be simple 
biophysical noise (i.e., randomness in firing rate s).  Furthermore the map may be a monotonic 
transformation of relative expected value, i.e., a relative expected utility, though more work is 
needed to distinguish if the observed curvature in these m appings is robust.  Hence the LIP 
generates a normalized representation of a RUM model where relative expected utility plus noise 
are represented by neuronal firing rates.  Note that the LIP encodes  relative expected utility of 
rewards rather than absolute values.  Experiments where the absolute reward levels are increased 
but the relative reward levels are maintained yield virtually identical mappings.   
The information from the LIP map is passed to a region called the frontal eye fields 
(FEF) in a manner that maintains the map‘s spatial organization.  The FEF, however, only gleans   24 
whether the action potentials associated with a specific location surpass a certain biophysical 
threshold.  After one location passes this threshold, the map is pruned of all other information 
and this location is passed to the superior colliculus, which triggers the ocular motor system to 
shift the animal‘s gaze to the location identified on the map.   
These studies provide an intriguing physical analog for the quantities that enter a simple 
RUM  model  and  detail  the  neurological  mechanism  that  identifies  the  option  to  be  chosen.  
Glimcher and colleagues go so far as to define these firing levels in the LIP as physiological 
expected utility.  However, several questions remain, such as: Does this region serve the same 
function in humans? Do other regions first generate similar maps and send the information in tact 
to the LIP?  Do other regions first encode absolute levels of expected utility and, if so, where and 
how does normalization occur?  This leads us to review emerging work in human imaging that 
details how the brain senses and evaluate reward. 
II.B The Neurological Basis of Reward  
Several  neural  regions  are  regularly  implicated  by  human  studies  of  reward  prediction  and 
evaluation, including the ventral striatum (or putamen), nucleus accumbens (NAc), orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC, see figure 2).  These regions, which 
Montague,  King-Casas  and  Cohen  [86]  call  the  ventral  valuation  network  (VVN),  provide 
similar qualitative responses to many rewards, including food and drink [118], pleasant smells 
[93], pleasing sounds [8], money [10], the exacting of revenge [28], and luxury cars [35].   
Each region has different sensitivities during the reward process, however.  For example, 
activity in the VMPFC appears to scale with the absolute  reward value [68,90] whereas the 
ventral  striatum,  NAc and OFC are particularly sensitive to  the predictability and timing of 
rewards [6].  The OFC is thought to be a neural clearinghouse where relative expected utilities   25 
are associated with potentially disparate options [85] for the purpose of comparison and action, 
which would lead it to take on a role similar to the LIP in monkeys (though such a consensus has 
not  been  reached  among  neuroscientists).    Each  of  these  areas  is  densely  populated  with 
dopamine neurons, and these neurons receive input from the ventral tagemental area (VTA) and 
the subtantia nigra (SN), which serve as the origin for much of the brain‘s dopamine flows.   
Dopamine plays a key communication role in the VVN.  The release of dopamine makes 
the recipient feel  good, which might be interpreted as the physiological basis for Bethamite 
hedonic  utility  or  a  ‗rush‘  of  pleasure.    Indeed,  many  illegal  drugs  (e.g.,  cocaine  and 
amphetamines) stop dopamine from being recaptured by neurons and heighten this euphoric rush 
(hence, the generic term ‗dope‘). 
Researchers initially though that dopamine directly signaled reward, i.e., larger rewards 
released  more  dopamine.    If  this  were  the  case,  dopamine  would  become  the  physiological 
analog  of  utility,  with  more  utility  (dopamine)  released  as  the  level  of  goods  and  services 
increased.    Subsequent  research  over  the  past  decade  revealed  that  this  dopamine-reward 
correspondence  is  only  partially  correct  and  that  the  role  of  dopamine  is  more  subtle.    For 
example,  Schultz,  Dayan  and  Montague  [107]  measure  the  activity  of  dopamine  releasing 
neurons in the VTA and SN of thirsty monkeys.  During the experiment, thirsty monkeys would 
receive a signal (bell) which would then be followed by fruit juice.  During initial trials, when 
the monkey was learning the link between signal and reward, the provision of the reward led to a 
dopamine spike (increased firing rate of dopamine releasing neurons) that sent dopamine to the 
NAc and ventral striatum.  In this case the reward‘s receipt corresponded to a dopamine rush.   
However, subsequent juice deliveries of the same volume resulted in smaller dopamine 
spikes, until dopamine levels observed during the receipt of the juice returned to a baseline level.    26 
Dopamine  levels  would  spike  immediately  following  the  cue,  however,  suggesting  that  the 
pleasure derived from consumption occurs in a reward‘s anticipation rather than in its receipt.
3   
On a subsequent trial, when the volume of juice was unexpectedly increased, dopamine 
levels spiked during the cue and immediately following receipt of the unexpectedly large reward.  
After several trials at this new, higher volume of juice, the post-reward dopamine levels dropped 
back to baseline.  Finally, when juice deliveries were reduced to the original level, post-reward 
dopamine levels dropped below baseline.  After several additional trials with the original juice 
delivery volumes, post-reward dopamine release levels returned to baseline.   
These experiments led to several key insights.  First dopamine release is synonymous 
with  reward  receipt  only  for  short-term  unexpected  changes  in  reward.    More  generally 
dopamine encodes not the absolute value of a reward but rather its value relative to what is 
expected.   In short, the most dopamine was delivered during unexpected rewards, while the 
dopamine  from  expected  rewards  quickly  diminishes  back  to  baseline.
4  Second, in stable, 
predictable rewarding scenarios, dopamine spikes upon the receipt of reliable cues of subsequent 
rewards rather than upon the receipt of the reward itself.  Schultz and colleagues postulate that 
this  mechanism  serves  a  crucial  role  in  learning,  where  increased  reward  stimulates  th e 
pleasurable dopamine release while the diminution a particular reward stymies dopamine release.  
These insights led the authors develop the temporal difference (TD) model of reward learning:  
  Dopamine neuron firing ratet = t = (Rewardt – t-1), 
where t is the reward prediction error in period t and  > 0.  In short the TD model simply states 
that satisfaction (dopamine release) with a given level of reward is transient, with any amount 
provided quickly leading to the same level of dopamine release.  TD models are now a common 
cornerstone of many decision making models, and rightfully so as the results of human imaging   27 
studies  involving  reward  delivery  regularly  adhere  these  predictions  [1,6,68,91,92].    One 
limitation of these experiments is the subject‘s inactive role, i.e., passively receiving signals and 
rewards.  The focus of the model is learning, and learning is most critical in situations when the 
subject must guide subsequent actions toward greater rewards, which suggests that TD models 
may only be part of the reward processing picture.   
When action is required to trigger reward delivery, different neural circuitry becomes 
involved and activity shifts to another striatal region (the dorsal striatum or caudate), which is 
connected to motor pathways that can trigger choice [33].  In such cases the temporal difference 
view of learning about reward becomes only one part of a larger system that assesses reward and 
motivates behavior.  This has led to the development of ‗critic-actor‘ models [101], in which one 
system is evaluates possible rewards while another system acts upon the information.   
Other neural structures that are intertwined with the VVN include the amygdala, anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), and dorsolateral  prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).    Each  region  has  been 
implicated in different aspects of the decision process.  The amygdala helps assess the value of 
emotive inputs, particularly aversive stimuli like fear [100], and passes relevant information to 
the NAc.  The ACC is thought to help identify and evaluate errors made during the decision 
making  process  and  to  serve  as  a  region  in  which  conflicts  between  competing  actions  are 
deliberated.    The  DLPFC  has  been  identified  as  an  executive  region  necessary  for  goal 
maintenance and the inhibition of impulsive behavior.   
Increasingly detailed neural processing models that articulate the roles of various neural 
substrates in each portion of the decision making process are now emerging.  These models 
generate predictions that guide subsequent experiments.  For example, Daw et al. [26] develops a 
model  where  TD  learning  executed  by  striatal  dopamine  neurons  competes  against  more   28 
statistically sophisticated learning models executed in frontal regions.  For potentially rewarding 
actions involving more complex sensory inputs, the model predicts that the simpler TD model 
may be preferred, which can lead to habit formation, i.e., the same actions are repeated even after 
the value of the reward associated with a particular action is diminished.  For events where the 
chain of causality from action to reward was more direct (and computation less costly), the more 
statistically sophisticated frontal learning system was used.  Because these systems utilize more 
data, they respond rapidly to changes in the value of rewards, i.e., habit formation is less likely.   
These models  tap into a deeper theme in  the  psychology  and cognitive neuroscience 
literature  –  that  of  multiple  evaluative  loops  and  decision  systems  [105].    This  literature 
postulates that two general types of processing are undertaken within the brain.  Autonomous 
processes are fast, cognitively efficient, and can be executed ‗in the background‘ while other 
items  process.    Often  these  processes  generate  highly  domain  specific  actions  for  common 
decisions that arise.  Controlled processes are slower, more cognitively taxing and more likely to 
engage for novel circumstances.  These contrasting systems may help organize the so-called 
exploit versus explore decision.  That is, decision makers perpetually face a tension between 
exploiting a current rewarding situation and exploring other possibly rewarding situations.  In 
noisy environments the fitness of the decision maker will be improved if it can identify and 
evaluate novel situations that might be worthy of exploration. 
Such  multi-loop  neural  models  [19,26,52],  which  postulate  evaluative  loops  with 
different  strengths  and  weaknesses,  have  served  as  the  neural  basis  for  recent  behavioral 
economic models that focus on self-control issues [3,39].
5  Pathologies such as addiction appear 
to undermine the brain‘s ability to allocate decisions to various evaluative loops and give rise to 
apparently sub-optimal choices, though the classification of these choices as sub-optimal is itself   29 
a matter of discussion and contention among economists [3,4]. 
While  the  focus  of  this  review  and  the  literature  centers  on  dopamine-based  neural 
communication,  there  is  also  evidence  that  other  neurotransmitters  such  as  serotonin, 
acetylcholine, norepinephrine and oxytocin may play important roles in neural theories of choice.  
For example Yu and Dayan [116] formulate a model in which acetylcholine provides a signal of 
riskiness while norepinephrine provides a signal of uncertainty, i.e., spiking when the broader 
context of decision making begins to shift and prior probabilities of reward may be irrelevant.  
The role of these neurotransmitters may be to force the system to switch among the various 
evaluative loops, to rely upon sensory cues or to allow for greater memory formation in response 
to new information.  McClure, Gilzenrat and Cohen [81] postulate that dopamine works with 
norepinepherine  to  help  a  multi-loop  system  effectively  shift  between  exploitative  and 
exploratory circuitry.  Other neurotransmitters also play critical roles in the decision making 
process.  For example, experiments with rats suggest that repression of serotonin can lead to 
decisions in which future rewards are discounted more heavily [29].
6  Oxytocin is critical in 
processing stimuli involving a social dimension, particularly facilitating interpersonal decisions 
that require some degree of trust on the part of the decision maker [70].   
III. Neoclassical Pillars Through the Lens of Biomedical Methods 
Evolutionary pressures clearly shaped the human brain‘s current form and function.  However, 
such pressures only drive selection to the point of ensuring production and survival of offspring, 
and not necessarily the execution of neoclassical utility maximization.  In this section we review 
some provocative studies that cause us to reconsider several assumptions of neoclassical utility 
theory critical to the conduct of welfare analysis.  Implications for decision modeling that arise 
from this selected review range from questions of validity of techniques for evaluating policies to   30 
fundamental  questions  about  the  foundational  assumptions  of  decision  making,  including 
preference coherence and stability.  We begin with a set of questions that arise in applied policy 
analysis then move on to more fundamental questions about preferences themselves. 
III.A. Differences between Rewards Expected and Rewards Received 
Evaluation of new policy requires predictions of behavior beyond the scope of observability.  In 
this section we explore two themes.  First, can an individual‘s stated preferences, elicited in a 
hypothetical scenario, provide meaningful information upon which to evaluate policy?  This 
issue holds a special place in the environmental economics literature as the use of contingent 
valuation has sparked a robust debate concerning the efficacy of methods in which individual 
responses hold no consequences, i.e., situations where the individual only engages in part of the 
decision making process (anticipation and decision) without experiencing any change in reward 
level.    Second,  for  revealed  preferences,  does  the  hedonic  representation  of  a  possible 
consequence during evaluation systematically differ from the hedonic experience  of reward?  
This section explores the basis for differences in anticipated versus experienced utility.  
III.A.1 Hypothetical Bias and Consequentiality 
The key question is this: can hypothetical responses reliably predict actual responses?  Neural 
imaging  can  shed  additional  light  on  this  question.    If  neural  activation  observed  during  a 
hypothetical question is indistinguishable from that  during a binding question, one may feel 
more confident in the efficacy of hypothetical questions.  Given our review of the process by 
which  learning  and  action  take  place  in  the  brain,  one  might  imagine  differences  between 
hypothetical and consequential decisions, as critical parts of the neural process use dopamine to 
update expectations based upon previously received rewards.   
While ‗hypothetical bias‘ has not been explicitly addressed using biomedical techniques,   31 
several studies may be informative.  Knutson et al. [68] perform fMRI while subjects complete a 
task featuring a sequence of visual stimuli.  Subjects see a colored square, then a cross-hairs, 
followed by the brief display (160 to 260 milliseconds) of a white square, during which subjects 
are to press a button.
7  Subjects then learn if the button was pushed in time (outcome phase).   
The researchers compared neural activation during two versions of this task.  In one 
subjects receive one dollar if a button is pus hed while the white square is displayed (rewarded 
trial); the reward is announced during the outcome phase.  In  the other version, subjects are 
asked to perform the same task even though they are aware that no financial reward is  available 
(unrewarded).  So, in one version the action has financial consequences, while  in the other the 
consequence is only the resolution of curiosity (did I press the button in time?). 
The  difference  in  neural  activation  between  rewarded  and  unrewarded  trials  was 
significant in several regions during both the anticipation and outcome phases of the trial.  The 
differences during anticipation were particularly stark – statistically different levels of activation 
were observed in 14 regions across the VVN and other related structures, including the NAc, the 
dorsal and ventral striatum, the mesial prefrontal cortex, and the amygdala.  The feedback phase 
produced differences in four regions, including the ventral striatum and the OFC.  Elliot et al. 
[31] perform a study featuring a task similar to [68].  Their results provide similar qualitative 
results;  neural  activity  in  several  regions  is  significantly  different  between  rewarded  and 
unrewarded trials including areas in the ventral striatum and amygdala.      
The tasks from the above two studies are not a perfect analog to tasks presented during 
contingent  valuation  exercises.    For  example,  a  dichotomous  choice  valuation  task  requires 
significant cognitive effort to evaluate if the proposed scenario is preferred before the subject 
physically responds (marks the survey), while in the fMRI tasks the subject faces no real choice   32 
(pressing the button is preferred to not pressing the button) and the focus is on executing the 
correct motor response.  Despite the differences from valuation tasks, the fMRI results suggest 
that unrewarded tasks engender a different neural process than rewarded tasks.   
Several modifications to the task to make it mirror common valuation tasks could provide 
a more direct test for potential differences in neural engagement engendered by hypothetical and 
consequential instruments and if various elicitation formats (open-ended versus discrete choice) 
affect the degree of differentiation in neural activity between hypothetical and consequential 
tasks.  Note that the Knutson et al. [68] task also features some ‗cheap talk‘ elements, which 
have proven fruitful in reducing hypothetical bias in experimental settings, where the subjects 
are asked to respond ‗as rapidly as possible‘ during unrewarded tasks.  It would be straight 
forward to alter an fMRI task to test the efficacy of cheap talk interventions.   
Most fMRI tasks require a discrete choice while, to the best of the authors‘ knowledge, 
no fMRI work has featured tasks in which open ended quantities are chosen by respondents.  Our 
intuition  is  that  open-ended  responses  more  directly  reflect  raw  utility  estimates,  which  are 
thought to be generated in the NAc and ventral striatum.  Hence, the vast differences observed in 
striatal and NAc activity between hypothetical and consequential formats may not bode well for 
calibrating  open-ended  responses.    Discrete  choice  formats,  on  the  other  hand,  require 
normalization of raw, option-specific utilities into relative utility terms.  If the lack of reward 
salience uniformly shifts these raw physiological utility measurements, the ordinal information 
may  still  be  retained,  particularly  if  neural  activation  in  the  areas  where  this  normalization 
process occurs (e.g., the OFC) is similar between hypothetical and consequential questions. 
III.A.2 Anticipated versus Experienced Utility 
To make a choice among alternatives, one must generate expectations, i.e., one must imagine and   33 
anticipate the results of each option.  The crucial question arises – is anticipation of a potential 
reward processed in a manner that is identical or consistent with the experience of receiving the 
reward?  Several fMRI studies suggest that reward expectation is processed differently than is 
reward receipt, even if there is no uncertainty concerning reward provision.  Many of these 
elements are obvious from the discussion of dopamine learning models in the previous section, 
where the dopamine flow associated with rewards shift from the time the reward is received to 
the time when a reward is expected (say, following a reliable cue).  Human imaging research 
confirms that neural activation during reward expectation is distinct from reward receipt. 
For example, Knutson et al. [68] find that different regions respond to the anticipation 
and experience of monetary rewards.  Consistent with simple TD models of dopamine learning, 
they find the ventral striatum and NAc activate in a monotonic fashion with the size of the 
anticipated reward but do not respond to the receipt of the reward.  Dissociated from this circuit 
is another circuit in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), which is insensitive to anticipation of 
gains but showed increased BOLD signal when the subject is given the reward.  Other studies 
also find a dissociation between regions processing reward anticipation and receipt (see [92] for 
a review) and point to several other regions often activated during anticipation (the amygdala and 
the orbitofrontal cortex, which also receive substantial inputs from the dopamine system). 
In line with the TD models, one vision is that expectation itself rapidly diminishes the 
ability for the receipt of reward to activate these dopamine rich areas and instead moves the 
accounting for such reward receipts to regions that are unable to generate such euphoric rushes 
of dopamine.  Hence, only unexpected rewards may activate dopamine releasing neurons.  The 
very act of forming expectations and anticipating reward may, through rapid habituation, alter 
the  region  that  processes  the  receipt  of  reward  and  open  the  door  to  a  difference  in  neural   34 
processing for reward anticipation and receipt.  This is in line with recent theories  [61] that 
formulate separate anticipated and experienced utility functions. 
Holland and Gallagher [55] note that both the amygdala and OFC are engaged when the 
brain  develops  the  expectations  against  which  delivered  rewards  are  compared  and,  hence, 
indirectly impact the dopaminergic flows following reward receipt.  These authors note that it is 
the amygdala that dominates with regard to expectation formation in the early stages of learning 
about the link between cues and eventual rewards, with the OFC later codifying this link.  When 
the environment changes, such that a cue is no longer linked to a reward, it is the amygdala that 
first signals this change.  The OFC merely ‗unlearns‘ the old relationship and waits for the 
amygdala to figure out the new relationship before codifying it.  It is the codified association in 
the OFC, however, that guides most decision making.  This region retains several sets of cue-
reward links for rapid comparison purposes during the events leading up to a final decision.   
This  lack  of  unified  neural  processing  between  expectation  and  experience  has 
fundamental consequences for welfare analysis.  For example, if we believe in a hedonic utility 
measurement, and wish to use this as the basis for policy making, do we base this measurement 
on the utility expected or actually experienced (see [60] for a discussion of this very question and 
[59] for related discussion)?  This goes beyond simple distinctions of stated versus revealed 
preferences, for often we pay for an item before using it.  Indeed, it is often the expectation of 
utility that prompts expenditure, not the actual utility experienced at the point of consumption.   
If there is systematic bias between the expectation and experience of reward such that 
people find choices suboptimal in hindsight, what is the role of policy?  In some instances, such 
as  addiction  [3,4,5],  this  deviation  between  expected  and  experienced  utility  may  become 
pathological, with consumers spending vast resources to try to override a system of consumption   35 
where  a cue (e.g.,  the sight  of another person lighting  a cigarette) triggers a vastly inflated 
expectation  of  utility  that  is  never  experienced.    Research  that  documents  such  systematic 
differences between expected and experienced utility naturally leads the discussion to topics that 
are uncomfortable for some economists, such as the possible role of paternalistic policies [11].   
III.B. Context Dependent Utility 
A key assumption of utility theory is that the arguments of a utility function are measured in 
absolute terms, i.e., income or the quantity of goods.  This is a seemingly innocuous assumption, 
particularly given the static nature of textbook examples of economic decision making.  With the 
popularization of prospect theory, which posits that human judgment is influenced by outcomes 
relative to logical reference points such as initial endowments (gains versus losses), more recent 
work has further developed models that formalize reference-dependent utility theories [71,110].   
Neoclassical utility functions are Spartan – the individual receives income, goods and 
services  that  neatly  translate  into  a  level  of  utility  according  to  the  given  functional  form.  
Behavioral economists are expanding utility functions to allow absolute rewards to be interpreted 
in context.  This context can come from many sources, including the individual‘s: past reward 
(self referential, giving rise to distinct treatment of losses and gains and baseline effects), peers 
or other reference groups (peer referential, ‗keeping up with the Jones‘), unexplored alternatives 
(counterfactual  referential,  giving  rise  to  ‗what  if‘  evaluations),  and  most  likely  outcomes 
(expectation referential, giving rise to unappreciated gains that fail to meet expectations).   
The  dopamine  learning  models  pave  the  way  for  this  context,  as  the  expectation  of 
reward can alter the brain regions that process its receipt.  Breiter et al. [10] demonstrate how the 
context of an absolute reward is crucial to the nature of neural responses during reward receipt.  
Building from theoretical work by Mellers et al. [82], they hypothesize that the same absolute   36 
reward (the receipt of no financial reward, $0) will generate different neural responses when this 
reward is the best possible outcome ($0, -$1.50, -$6) than when it is the worst ($10, $2.50, $0).  
The authors find two regions – the NAc and sublenticular extended amygdala (a region near the 
NAc and amygdala) – reveal greater relative activation when receiving $0 was the best outcome 
than when it was the worst.  The authors suggest this is congruent with the subject treating $0 as 
a gain in the former case and a loss in the latter case, though they caution that this interpretation 
may only hold for extreme cases because the results from a case in which the receipt of $0 was a 
middling alternative did not result in an intermediate level of relative activation.   
Coricelli et al. [24] also find that counterfactual information affects the neural processes 
involved  in  outcome  evaluation  as  well  as  the  neural  processes  engaged  to  cast  subsequent 
decisions.  In their fMRI task subjects observe a pair of gambles, choose the preferred gamble, 
see  the  preferred  gamble‘s  resolution  and  receive  notification  that  their  payment  has  been 
adjusted accordingly.  In some trials subjects also observe the outcome of the unselected gamble, 
providing the subject with counterfactual data.  They show that the revelation of counterfactual 
data,  while  not  altering  the  subject‘s  financial  reward,  does  alter  how  the  resolution  of  the 
selected gamble is processed by the brain and how brain activity adjusts in subsequent decisions.  
Specifically they show that the OFC is more active when counterfactual data is provided, with 
the level of OFC activation scaling linearly with the level of relief or regret.  That is, OFC 
activity drops below baseline if the subject‘s choice turns out better than the unselected gamble 
(relief)  and  rises  above  baseline  if  the  unselected  gamble  turns  out  better  than  the  selected 
gamble (regret).  The ACC and hippocampus reveal similar sensitivities to counterfactual data.   
When  subjects  suffer  a  ‗regretful‘  outcome  in  a  particular  trial,  it  influences  neural 
activity  during  the  subsequent  decision.    During  the  choice  following  a  regretful  outcome,   37 
several additional regions display activity including the DLPFC, which is implicated in behavior 
necessary to control impulsive choices.  As more regretful outcomes are accumulated, the OFC 
becomes  increasingly  active  as  does  the  amygdala,  which  is  known  to  communicate  the 
emotional valence of stimuli.  Ursu and Carter [112] and Windmann et al. [115] find similar 
evidence concerning the role of such context during reward processing and decision making. 
These  findings  provide  a  neurological  basis  for  the  expanding  volume  of  work  on 
framing effects.  It creates some difficult questions for posing hypothetical questions that might 
be used to evaluate policy alternatives, as a particular frame must be chosen, and for interpreting 
the relevance of revealed preference data if the past decisions leading to the collected data were 
cast in a frame that might differ from future circumstances. 
III.C. Malleable Preferences 
Economics  has  primarily treated preferences  as complete, fixed and static.   In the words  of 
Hobbes [54, pg. 100], ―…consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly 
(like mushrooms), come to full maturity, without any kind of engagement with each other.‖  This 
assumption  provides  great  convenience  for  welfare  analyses,  as  there  exists  a  stable  set  of 
sovereign  preferences  against  which  gains  and  losses  can  consistently  be  measured.    Any 
proposed policy changes will yield predictable surplus changes that can be used to assess the 
desirability of the proposed change and rank competing proposals.  If policy alternatives were to 
purposefully  shift  preferences,  however,  the  basis  for  neoclassical  welfare  analysis  becomes 
murky.  In this section we review several studies that explore how policy may shape preferences. 
III.C.1. The Role of Advertising and Promotion 
Persuasive communication lies at the heart of many strategic initiatives in the private and public 
sectors.  While some initiatives strictly inform people of available options so that choices better   38 
reflect  current  preferences,  many  initiatives  persuade  individuals  to  alter  their  preferences.  
Branding  is  a  prime  example  of  persuasive  campaigns.    Brands  are  key  elements  of  many 
business plans, and through promotional campaigns, brand imagery has pervaded our culture. 
McClure et al. [81] explore the role of brands in the processing of primary rewards.  In 
their famous reworking of the ―Pepsi Challenge‖ the authors gather fMRI images as subjects 
taste  Pepsi  and  Coke.    In  some  scans,  subjects  were  not  informed  which  brand  was  being 
delivered (blind), while in other scans the delivery of one cola was always preceded by the 
presentation  of  the  brand‘s  logo  (branded).    During  blind  taste  tests  outside  of  the  scanner, 
subjects‘  choices  between  Coke  and  Pepsi  were  equally  split  and  were  not  significantly 
correlated with previously stated brand preferences.  However, the brand chosen in the blind 
taste test did generate a larger BOLD signal in the VMPFC during fMRI scanning.  The VMPFC 
is a region known for registering gustatory rewards.  The two colas engendered no differences in 
activity in other brain regions so long as the scanned subjects were blind to the brand identity. 
Once  brands  were  identified,  several  interesting  results  emerge.    In  a  standard  (non-
scanning)  taste  test,  subjects  systematically  prefer  Coke  to  an  unlabeled  alternative,  which 
subjects were told could be either Pepsi or Coke, but was always Coke.  However, when the 
same taste test was given for Pepsi, subjects did not systematically prefer Pepsi to an unlabeled 
alternative, where subjects were also told the alternative was either Coke or Pepsi but, in reality, 
was always Pepsi.  Hence, the subject pool regularly preferred labeled Coke to unlabeled Coke, 
but were essential indifferent between labeled and unlabeled Pepsi.
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When these taste tests were repeated during scanning, the differences in BOLD response 
between the labeled and unlabeled cola produced no difference in the VMPFC.  That is, neural 
response in the VMPFC was the same whether labeled or unlabeled cola was delivered.  This is   39 
not surprising given there was no change in the chemical composition of the liquid delivered.  
However, statistically significant differences in BOLD response for labeled and unlabeled Coke 
(but  not  Pepsi)  were  observed  in  other  brain  regions.    Specifically,  several  locations  in  the 
hippocampus and one region in the DLPFC recorded greater activation for the branded than the 
unbranded Coke.  Both regions have been previously associated with emotion-related behavioral 
change.  The hippocampus has also been implicated in the recall of emotion-based memories.  
We  interpret  these  results  as  a  preference  shift.    The  neural  evaluative  process  and 
subsequent choice of product were clearly altered by branding.  It would appear that Coke‘s 
branding efforts were effective in altering the manner in which a simple appetitive reward was 
processed by the brain, at least for the subjects involved in this study.  When brand information 
was absent, subjects generated neural responses in one region (VMPFC) that correlated with 
brand-blinded choices, while the revelation of Coke‘s brand image activated a separate circuit in 
a manner consistent with actual choice.  This finding spawns many questions.  What are the 
neural mechanisms that integrate the additional input from the hippocampus and DLPFC with 
the  unchanged  input  from  the  VMPFC  to  change  the  preference  ordering  between  the  two 
brands?    Are  there  other  manifestations  of  preference  change  that  lead  to  different  neural 
patterns?  For example, could commercial communications lead to a change in VMPFC activity?  
This finding also spawns some fundamental questions concerning welfare analysis, which we 
articulate and discuss at the close of this section. 
III.C.2. Genetics, Environmental Factors, and Preference Change 
The human genome project and its concomitant technical improvements in assaying individual 
genetic differences have created an explosion of studies focused on linking genotypes to higher-
order  phenotypes  such  as  personality  types  and  behavioral  disorders.    For  example,  several   40 
promising studies have linked polymorphisms in genes known to affect the functioning of key 
neurotransmitters to psychometrically defined personality dimensions related to risk aversion, 
e.g., Bjork et al. [7] correlate a serotonin polymorphism with heterogeneity in impulse control.  
Other examples include work by David E. Comings and several sets of colleagues who correlate 
polymorphisms in genes associated with several neurotransmitters with: pathological gambling 
[23];  several  dimensions  of personality  [22];  and several  complex behavioral  disorders  [21].  
While Comings  and others  (see  [87] for  a review) have suggested some intriguing linkages 
between genes and behavior with import for economic behavior, this literature has been marked 
by inconsistent results, with many initial findings failing to be replicated [87].   
This led researchers to investigate if the lack of replication was due, in part, to a failure to 
control  for  environmental  factors  affecting  gene  expression.    While  the  concept  of 
environmentally mitigated genetic impacts on phenotype is not new [76], the number of studies 
that  test  for  gene-environment  interactions  has  only  recently  increased.    A  seminal  gene-
environment study by Caspi et al. [17] analyzes genetic correlation between a polymorphism in 
genes  affecting  serotonin  function  and  recent  episodes  of  depression  for  a  large  cohort  of 
subjects.  Depression, while a clinically defined medical disorder, can also be thought of as a 
shift  in  preferences  for  a  wide  array  of  consumption  goods  and  leisure,  as  a  subject‘s 
neurological response to basic rewards is strongly affected.  For example the Rand Corporation 
[97] estimates that employers lose more than $51 billion per year due to employee depression.   
Caspi and colleagues found an increased likelihood of a major depressive episode after 
enduring one or more major life stressors (related to employment, financial, housing, health or 
relationship issues) during the past five years for the 69 percent of subjects with one genetic 
variant.  The other subjects revealed no relationship between major life events and depression.    41 
This path-breaking study is important for several reasons.  First, it documents how elements of 
the macroeconomic situation can impact individual preferences.  Unemployment and financial 
stressors, which are potentially tied to the aggregate economic situation, can lead to outcomes 
such as depression that can shift preferences and impact the supply and effectiveness of labor.  
One  can  see  how  economic  depressions  received  this  moniker  and  postulate  feedback 
mechanisms that may recast the modeling of business cycle dynamics.   
The  Caspi  et  al.  [17]  study  has  inspired  a  growing  number  of  replication  studies 
[44,48,64]  and  related  studies  that  test  for  environmentally  mitigated  correlations  between 
genetics  and  other  behavioral  and  personality  outcomes  (conduct  disorder,  [37];  behavioral 
inhibition, [38]; childhood depression, [62]; novelty seeking, [63]).
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potentially large segments of the population are genetically predisposed to preference shifts that 
may be triggered by the outcomes of the policy process.   
III.C.3. Therapeutic Methods of Changing Preferences 
The  multi-loop  decision-making  models  discussed  in  section  II.B  posit  competition  between 
striatal and frontal brain regions where striatal circuits use dopamine to quickly code rewards 
relative to expectations while the frontal regions integrate information from striatal and other 
regions, and may engage in more sophisticated evaluation.  Therapeutic interventions, such as 
drugs or physical stimulation, could affect the relative output of certain neural regions or tip the 
balance of inputs during decision making in a manner that alters subsequent choice.  
Knoch et al. [66] use TMS to reveal one tantalizing example of such an intervention.  The 
investigators had three groups play a simple game in which the subject chooses between a pair of 
gambles where one gamble involves a higher reward with lower probability of winning.  Prior to 
playing  the  game,  one  group  receives  low-frequency  TMS  to  the  right  DLPFC,  one  group   42 
receives  the  same  treatment  to  the  left  DLPFC,  while  the  third  group  receives  a  placebo 
treatment  over  the  right  DLPFC.    Subjects  receiving  TMS  over  the  right  DLPFC,  which  is 
densely connected and co-activates with the adjacent areas in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
choose riskier options with greater frequency than the other two groups.  Thus, it would appear 
that TMS, when applied to the right DLPFC, can shift risk preferences temporarily. 
The right region of the OFC has been implicated in the control of impulsive behavior 
[42].  It opens the door to understanding how manipulation of this region could alter decision 
making behavior.  The authors speculate that alternative TMS frequencies may lead to alternative 
neuronal  firing patterns and, hence, alternative behavioral  responses, and cite evidence from 
previous work that correlates TMS frequency with a spectrum of behavioral responses [65].   
While Knoch et al. [66] report increased risk taking due to TMS, others have identified 
interventions that cause the opposite affect.  Rahman et al. (2006) work with subjects that have a 
type of dementia known to affect the OFC, which causes them to take more risky decisions than 
age-matched  healthy  controls.    The  investigators  find  that  the  administration  of  Ritalin 
(methylphenidate) reduced the tendency of the  dementia patients  to  take risky bets.   Ritalin 
consumption has been shown to increase neural dopamine flows, which is important for reward 
error signaling and learning that requires feedback between frontal and striatal brain regions.   
Risk-taking  behavior  is  not  the  only  arena  in  which  preferences  can  be  altered  via 
therapeutic manipulations.  Knoch et al. [67] replicate the experimental design from [66] only 
they  replace  the  game  involving  gambles  with  an  ultimatum  game.    The  ultimatum  game 
involves  a first-mover, who proposes  a division of a fixed amount of money, and a second 
mover, who can accept or reject the first mover‘s proposal.  Acceptance leads to distribution of 
the money according to the first-movers offer, while rejection leads to no payment for either   43 
party.  The neoclassically rational response by the second mover is to accept any non-negative 
offer, though a broad range of experimental data suggests that offers distributing less than 25 
percent of the money to the second mover are regularly rejected.   
Knoch et al. [67] apply TMS to the second mover prior to the accept/reject decision.  
Furthermore, in half the trials, the first mover‘s offer is the choice of a human first mover, while 
for the remaining trials the offer is randomly generated by a computer.  In each case the second 
mover knows whether a human or a computer made the offer.  This design element allows the 
investigators to determine whether the second-mover‘s response is motivated by interpersonal 
considerations or by a mere concern of payment equity.   
As in [66] TMS to the right DLPFC evoked significantly different choices, with this 
group  being  more  likely  to  accept  the  smallest,  ‗least  fair‘  offers  and  to  spend  less  time 
contemplating unfair offers.  Interestingly, all groups rated the fairness of such offers equally, 
suggesting  that  while  beliefs  about  the  fairness  of  such  offers  were  not  different  across  the 
treatment groups, the propensity to reject unfair offers was affected.  Furthermore, the three 
groups were no different in their propensity to reject the same offer if it were generated by a 
computer.  This solidifies that the interpretation that manipulating the right DLPFC via TMS 
affects how the subjects process the interpersonal emotive content of the offer.  The investigators 
suggest that the disruption in the right DLPFC hinders integration of information from areas of 
the brain the generate input concerning the emotional, interpersonal aspects of the situation, 
which allows pure self interest to then dominate the decision making process, though further 
investigation will be needed to solidify such an interpretation. 
Kosfeld et al. [70] also manipulate preferences in social economic exchange through the 
nasal administration of a key neurotransmitter, oxytocin.
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or in a risky investment game, subjects are nasally administered either oxytocin or a placebo.  
The trust game involves a first mover (investor) and a randomly-matched second mover (trustee), 
who each receives identical monetary endowments.  The investor may send to the trustee some 
portion of the endowment, which is tripled by the experimenter before being given to the trustee; 
both parties know that transferred funds are tripled.  After receiving the transfer, the trustee may 
send any portion of the accumulated funds back to the investor, though there is no multiplication 
of this ‗back-transfer.‘  The investor faces a risk if he transfers funds because the trustee may 
behave selfishly and return nothing to the investor.   
The risk game played by the remaining subjects was constructed such that the subject 
faced the same opportunity to transfer money from an endowment into a risky investment, where 
the odds of losing the investment or receiving a payout mirrored the investor‘s probabilities and 
payments in the trust game.  However, whether an investment resulted in a return or a loss was 
driven by a non-human random process.  Hence, the investigators could disentangle whether 
oxytocin may have affected the subject‘s tolerance for any risk or only interpersonal risk. 
The authors find that investors receiving oxytocin transferred significantly more to the 
trustee than did the placebo group, though the oxytocin and placebo groups invested the same in 
the generic risky investment.  This suggests that oxytocin shifted interpersonal risk aversion 
(Bohnet and Zeckhauser [9] call this betrayal aversion).  Aside from its functional importance 
during child birth and nursing, oxytocin receptors are located in brain regions associated with 
social  behavior,  including  those  regularly  engaged  during  the  formation  of  normal  social 
attachments and affiliations.  Given these results, it appears that the ability to trust others in 
economic exchange may be counted as a context in which oxytocin plays a role.   
III.C.4. Malleable Preferences and Welfare Analysis   45 
The  findings  in  the  previous  three  subsections  spawn  some  intriguing  questions  concerning 
policy analysis.  Focusing particularly on the McClure et al. [81] study in which brand revelation 
produced alterations in choice and neural processing, let us conduct a simple thought experiment.  
Assume  a  world  where  every  person  has  an  unlimited  supply  of  generic  cola  that  is  freely 
supplied by government.  There are no competing colas or other close substitutes.  Each person 
consumes the maximum feasible amount of cola and the cola that goes unused is freely disposed.  
Each person is fully familiar with its taste and its nutritional properties.  Furthermore, everyone 
knows that there are no long-term benefits or costs associated with its consumption and there are 
no short-term productivity boosts associated with its consumption (assume it is caffeine free).   
Now consider a proposal that spends a billion dollars to create a logo and expansive 
advertising  campaign  for  this  cola,  complete  with  toe-tapping  jingles  and  commercials  that 
associate drinking the cola with attractive people.  No person will drink more cola because of 
this – everyone is already drinking as much as is possible.  How would a traditional cost-benefit 
analysis rate such a policy?  The math is straightforward – the policy creates $1 billion in costs 
and  yields  no  benefits.    However,  if  the  promotional  campaign  is  as  effective  as  the  Coke 
campaigns were for the subjects in [81], it is clear that some type of surplus is being created.   
This hypothetical policy proposal is particularly troubling because it specifically seeks to 
alter preferences.  By the assumptions of neoclassical theory, preferences are stable, hence any 
policy aimed at changing them would be ineffective.  If consumers merely lacked information 
concerning product attributes and that information was costly, the problem would be tractable by 
neoclassical standards, as there exists latent surplus that is created when information is provided 
that allows uninformed consumers to fully assess products against fixed preferences and alter 
decisions accordingly.  However, in our example, we assume consumers are fully informed.     46 
Governments  engage  in  programs  aimed  to  influence  public  opinion  and  preference, 
though  it  is  unclear  how  such  programs  would  be  evaluated  in  a  neoclassical  cost-benefit 
paradigm.  Surely the loss experienced by a population from, say, restricting the availability of a 
particular good (e.g., beach access) will be lessened if accompanied by campaigns that reduce 
the preference for these goods.  The question becomes whether there exists a coherent approach 
to evaluation that ranks potential policies given that policies try to change preferences.   
Sugden  [111]  proposes  that,  when  preferences  are  incoherent,  e.g.,  different  decision 
frames  could  lead  to  different  policy  conclusions,  the  analyst  should  rely  upon  the  results 
generated  from  data  created  by  the  decision  frame  that  will  manifest  during  the  long-run 
implementation of the policy.  While not arguing with this logic, such a recommendation may 
not be desirable if preference change itself is one of the policies under consideration.   
Let us return to our generic cola example.  Suppose the government considers ending its 
provision of generic cola and banning its use.  It estimates that the lost surplus associated with a 
ban is $1 billion per year while cola provision costs $800 million.  Clearly the ban would not 
pass  a  cost-benefit  test.    Now  suppose  the  government  conducts  a  $250  million  aversion 
campaign that causes  people to  dislike cola and  drives the surplus  lost from  a ban to  $100 
million.  The $250 million for the aversion campaign plus the $100 million in lost surplus are 
now less that the $800 million spent delivering cola.  While an outright ban of the cola could not 
pass a cost benefit test, a ban coupled with an aversion campaign can if the value of consumer 
surplus is measured at the post-implementation position.   
IV. The Future of Environmental Policy Analysis 
While  still  in  its  infancy,  at  least  in  the  study  of  economic  decision  making,  the  use  of 
biomedical  technologies  has  irrevocably  and  perhaps  irreparably  shaken  the  foundations  of   47 
positive welfare analysis.   The early stages  of  our understanding of the decision process  as 
viewed through the lens of neurologists prevent us from making decisive conclusions about the 
future of environmental policy analysis.  Rather this discussion should be viewed as a wake-up 
call for environmental decision makers and analysts.  In light of the future transparency (or at 
least translucency) of the decision process afforded by ever improving technologies, fundamental 
questions arise about the future of welfare analysis as a tool for policy decisions. 
It is our view that we approach a three-pronged fork in the road.  The first path ignores 
the  growing  set  of  biomedical  results  on  decision  processes  (of  which  only  a  fraction  are 
described herein) and stubbornly maintains the current course.  In other words, the neoclassical 
model  is  correct  and  welfare  analysis  based  on  the  neoclassical  decision  model  is  not  only 
defensible but correct.  Such a path is attractive, though potentially unfulfilling and dangerous.  
In its simplest form, neoclassical policy analysis is an outcome based approach.  Early modelers 
could not view the intricate details of the decision process.  Rather they relied on what people 
said and did.  Observed behavior was then used to derive models of decision making consistent 
with observed outcomes.  These reduced-form decision-making models provide the foundation 
for prediction and evaluation of new policies that are beyond the scope of observable behavior.   
Technological  restrictions  prevented  an  in-depth  understanding  of  the  actual  decision 
process leading to observed behaviors and in the end leaves us with an analytical framework 
based  on  how  we  think  people  make  decisions.    This  is  not  to  criticize  the  neoclassical 
foundations of policy analysis, but rather to appeal for a broader understanding of the decision 
process now that technology allows it.  Once we accept the need for a broader understanding of 
decision making with foundations in modern decision science, we are left with a choice between 
two equally challenging paths of future research.   48 
One path abandons and reinvents neoclassical decision theory.  Researchers may think: If 
neurological  findings  reject  the  basic  assumptions  of  neoclassical  preference  theory,  then 
neurological  preference  theory  is  invalid  and  all  techniques  based  on  such  assumptions  are 
invalid.  The implications of such thinking are troubling.  Rejection of neoclassical decision 
theory means either developing new schools of thought for decision modeling, or abandoning the 
pretense of behavioral modeling in favor of process based approaches to policy design.  While 
philosophically defensible, we feel this is overly pessimistic.  Adherents to such thinking will 
make reference to strict interpretation of the scientific method:  If the underlying assumptions are 
proven invalid, the entire theory and all consequent testable hypotheses must be rejected.   
The final path continues to extend neoclassic thinking to accommodate bumps in the 
road.  While more optimistic in its outlook, such a path still presents a daunting task. The first 
steps down this path are underway.  Within the broad scope of neoclassical preferences, teams of 
interdisciplinary researchers have begun to provide a rich set of models for thinking about the 
complex decision processes being uncovered.  Although these models are at times simplistic, at 
times case specific and, as of yet, do not yield universal frameworks for policy analysis, the 
extension of existing models for welfare analysis keeps the focus on the evaluation of potential 
outcomes.   We view Bernheim and Rangel‘s neurologically inspired models of addiction and 
subsequent analysis of policy options [3,4,5] to be exemplars of such an approach.   
In contrast  to  Robert Frost‘s  two roads diverging, the three possible future paths  for 
environmental policy analysis are not equally attractive in foresight—although in hindsight, the 
path chosen may indeed make all the difference.  While we, as a discipline, are not in a position 
to determine the correct path just yet, the rapidly accelerating volume of results flowing from the 
biomedical-social science interface will soon force us to choose a path.     49 
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Notes
                                                 
1 By non-invasive, we mean the surface of the subject need never be punctured.   
2 The eye-gaze choice mechanism is preferred because the motor system driving eye movements 
is independent of the more general motor system and vastly simpler to understand and track.   
3 In the words of Arthur Schopenhauer, ―A man‘s delight in looking forward to and hoping for 
some particular satisfaction is a part of the pleasure flowing out of it, enjoyed in advance.‖   
4 Congruent with Carl Sandburg‘s insight, ―Nearly all the best things that come to me in life have 
been unexpected, unplanned by me.‖ 
5 However, as Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer [46] caution, it is not accurate to depict the human 
decision making process as involving distinct, independent systems where the more rapid and 
simplistic evaluation loops are labeled as ‗primitive,‘ ‗irrational,‘ or ‗emotive‘ because there is 
ample interaction among the systems. 
6 However, progress in more precisely refining the role of serotonin in theories of choice has 
been hindered because, unlike for dopamine, the measurement of serotonin neuron activity faces 
greater technical difficulties [26]. 
7 Highly motivated and trained subjects do not always press the button in time, particularly for 
the shortest display lengths of the white square.   
8 This finding essentially reverses the ―Pepsi, no Coke‖ stance emphatically maintained by Pete 
Dionasopolis (John Belushi), the owner/operator of the Olympia Café (Saturday Night Live, 
circa 1977). 
9 One issue that is still unclear is whether such interactions are relevant for all age groups or only 
younger age groups, as most of the studies revealing significant interactions use subj ects under 
the age of 30.  In fact, a replication of the Caspi et al.  [17] study involving older subjects 
revealed no significant interaction between the genetic and environmental aspects of depression  
[44].  This may suggest a greater influence of stressful life events on the behavioral outcomes of 
younger populations, though more research is needed to solidify such a conclusion. 
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Figure 1. Flow of neural processing for a discrete choice task as executed by a monkey.  
Adapted from Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005)   58 
 
Figure 2. Side (saggital) view of a brain cross section detailing key regions of interest in many reward-related studies.   
Inset picture: front (coronal) cross section of two key regions of the striatum, dorsal (caudate) and ventral (putamen).   
Source: Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2004)   59 
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